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Abstract
An elementary proof, as well as an asymptotic version of David
Schmeidler's theorem on the Equilibrium Points of Nonatomic Games is
presented.

Equilibrium Points of NonAtomic Games : Asymptotic Results
Salim Rashid
The theory of n-person non zero-sum games has possessed an equilib-
rium theorem for many years but there are still not many results charac-
terising the solutions of such games. In 1973 David Schmeidler (1) par-
tially rem.edied this situation for a class of games defined on a
nonatonic measure space by showing that there existed equilibria for
such games in which almost every individual uses a pure strategy;
Schmeidler 's paper does not estab2ish any asymptotic results and he uses
fairly sophisticated properties of the integrals of set-valued functions
to establish his results. In this paper we provide an as^miptotic ver-
sion of Schmeidler 's result using only elementary arguments.
Ke begin with a finite set of players, 1, 2, . .
.
, n, and the non-
negative unit simplex s on m-dimensional ccmmoditv space. An nm dimen-°
• m
sional vector is announced, allocating a vector in the simplex to each
of the n players. Every player disregards the bundle allocated to him,
but keeping in mind the vectors allocated to all other players, chooses
a bundle in the simplex that maximises his utility. An individual's
utility is dependent both upon what he gets as well as what every other
player gets; the utility function is linear in the bundle chosen by the
player and continuous as a function of the vectors allocated to all other
players. If x denotes the vector of allocations across all players but
player t, then the t player's problem can be stated as
max X • V(t,x^) = x^^V^^(S^) + • • • + x^^ V^^(x^)
X£S
m
where each V
. is a continuous function of x . Call this problem A. A
tj t
choice of strategies (x, , . .
.
, x ) is a (Nash) equilibrium if, for all
players and all peS , x • V(t,x ) >_ p • V(t,x ). The existence of
equilibria for problem A is a special case of classical results and will
be assumed. In general, the equilibrium vectors chosen will not be pure
strategies— i.e., vectors of the form (1, 0, . . ., 0), (0, 1, . . . , 0)
,
etc. Let us now specialise the V. (x ) so that the V.^ depend only on^ jt' t' jt ^ ^
the average sum
E X.
n
Call this problem E. Schmeidler's principal theorem shows that, for
games played on nonatomic measure spaces, there exists an equilibrium
for problem B in which almost every player— i.e., except for a set of
measure zero—uses a pure strategy. This result may alternatively be
expressed as follows:
The solution to problem A, with n players, may be written as an
n X m matrix, each row of which is a vector in the unit simplex of m-
space. Under the additional hypotheses of problem B, Schmeidler showed
that there exist solutions in which the optimal strategy for "most"
traders consists of a unit vector of the form (0, 1, 0, . . .,0). The
asymptotic version to be proved here will show that when problem B is
played by n agents, then there exist Nash "equilibria" in which all but
n - m agents will be approximately maximal when using a pure strategy;
the distance from full maximality for these n - m agents tends to zero
as n ^ -=, while the number of agents who are not even approximately maxi-
mal while using pure strategies is bounded above by m, the fixed dimen-
sion of commodity space.
The proof will depend heavily upon the two following observations,
1. Denote problem B' as the variant of problem B in which each V
,
de-
tk
n n
pends not on Z x./n, but on Z x./n. As Z x./n differs from Z x./n
2tt ^ j=l ^ 2*t ^ j=l ^
by at m.ost (-1/n, . . ., ±l/n) , the continuity of the V ensure that
the difference between the optimal solutions to problems B and B' will
tend to zero as n tends to "^. For our asymptotic result, it will there-
fore suffice if we solve problem B exactly.
2. As we are maximising a linear function over a polyhedral convex set,
if a maximum is reached at a convex combination of vertices, it is also
reached at every one of these vertices—e.g., if the optimal vector is
(x-.
, x^, 0, . . ., 0), then the optimal value is also reached at either
of (1,0,..., 0) or (0, 1,0, . . .,0).
The Nash Equilibrium allocation that is guaranteed us by the gen-
eral results on n person games may be represented in matrix form as be-
low, with the rows adding up to one, and the columns adding up to
K^ , . .
.
, K respectively.
^11 • • ^Im 1
•
•
nl Xnm
1
^^1 Km
n
Under the additional assumptions of problem B', can we rearrange the
matrix such that, for all but a fixed set of traders, each row is a unit
basis vector, with the 1 in a position which had a positive entry?
Were it not for the condition that we must not introduce a positive
entry in an element which is zero, the desired result would follow di-
rectly from the Shapley-Folkman Theorem upon noting that the simplex is
nothing but the convex hull of the unit vectors in m-space.
In order to make the Shapley-Folkman Theorem applicable, all we
have to do is to define a new simplex for each row. Thus, if in the
first row only, the first, fourth, and fifth entries are positive, let
S. denote the vectors (1, 0, 0, 0, . . .,0), (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, , 0),
and (0, , 0, 0, 1, 0, . , . , 0) . If the second row has only the second
and third entries positive, let S„ denote the vectors (0, 1,
. . .,0) and (0 , , 1, , . . . , 0) . Do this for each row and define
, th
an appropriate S. tor the j row.
(K^, , K ) lies in the convex hull of ES . . Hence, bv the
' m' J
Shapley-Folkman Theorem there exists a way of choosing vectors from
con S. such that
(K,
, . .
.,K) = !;s.+ Z con S .
,1 ' m J j'
where the indices J, and J„ are such that J + J^ = n and |J„| <_ m.
Hence, except for at most m players, other individuals are at an optimum
using a pure strategy. This proves the theorem. More formally:
Let G denote an n-person non-cooperative game in which every agent
has the ra-dimensional Euclidean simplex as its strategy space. The pay-
off to each individual is linear in his own strategy and depends on the
sun of everyone else's activities. Thus,
U^(x^; x^, ..., x^) = x^^V^^(_? X ) + ... + x^^V^JZ X ).
2=2 j=2
Let L%", . . ., U " denote the utilities obtained at the Nash equilibriumIn ^
point
.
Theorem: For anv £ > 0, there exists n such that G possesses an ap-
" n
proximate Nash solution with utilities U,-'-', . . ., U •'" with the fol-
1 n
lowing property: lu." - U.""| < e for at least n - m agents.
Note
The Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Cassels, 1975) states: If
S., j=l, . .
.
, n, is a collection of sets in m-dimensional space, n > m.
and con S. is the convex hull of S., then for any x£ Z con s., there
1 2 3=1 ^
exists a representation of x of the following form:
X = Z V. + Z z .
,
^1 -^2
where v.sS., z.£ con S., J, + J^ = n, and the number of elements in J^222 j' 1 2 ' 2
is no greater than m.
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